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ABSTRACT
The article offers an overview and reflection on the dynamics of the military role taking into account 
different security contexts and significant others. It analyses two dominant types of military roles: warrior 
embedded in the realistic perspective on security and peacekeeper grounded in the liberal approach. Finally, 
it examines the dynamics of the modern military role in the light of the internal-external security nexus. The 
article shows that the contemporary military role needs not only to combine warrior and peacekeeper roles 
but also develop some new elements in order to meet the requirements of the contemporary security context.
The article begins by setting a theoretical framework that allows for an analysis of drivers of change of 
the military role. It then moves towards an examination of the contextual drivers of change which influence 
the two traditional conceptualisations of military role: a “warrior” and a “peacekeeper”. Next, the article 
turns towards the topic of internal-external security nexus as characteristic to the contemporary security 
context. Finally, it considers the contextual drivers of change within two areas of military involvement: 
domestic counter-terrorism operations and cyber security. The article ends with three main conclusions. 
Firstly, the contemporary military role requires more adaptability with regard to referent objects. Secondly, 
the contemporary military role requires more flexibility with regard to countering threats and the application 
of violence. Thirdly, the flexibility of the contemporary military role is necessitated by close collaboration 
with other actors who participate in provision of security.
Key words: role theory, military role, warrior, peacekeeper, internal-external security nexus
1 The article is supported by a research grant entitled “The influence of roles of civil-military coope-
ration officers on the effectiveness of their mission in peacekeeping” (No. 2015/17/N/HS5/00415), financed 
by the National Science Centre, Poland.
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INTRODUCTION
The so-called traditional role of the military was constructed in a security context 
defined by war or its proximity, where the primary objective of the armed forces 
was to protect the state from external threats. In this realistic conceptualisation, the 
place of the military in the society was defined by its relation to the state, national 
political elites and the external enemy forces [Franke 1999a]. Together with the 
development of peacekeeping missions, entrenched in the liberal paradigm, the 
security context and, consequently, the role of the military changed. The main 
objective of the military was no longer the protection of the state, the new enemy 
was often ill-defined and there appeared multiple other actors (such as international 
public opinion or multinational peacekeeping forces) that influenced the military 
role [Franke 1999a].
In both cases, the context in which the military operates has a strong external 
orientation. In the traditional conceptualisation of the military role, the armed forces 
are employed to fight an external enemy and in peacekeeping they are sent to external 
missions. However, the context in which the military operates is constantly evolving 
and seems to be increasingly characterised with the internal-external security nexus 
[Eriksson, Rhinard 2009: 243–267]. This specific security context introduces new 
drivers of change in the military role, which have so far been rarely discussed in the 
academic literature. This is not to say that the roles shaped in the externally-oriented 
context have become obsolete, but they are required to become flexible enough to 
accommodate new types of referent objects, threats and an increasing number of other 
actors distinctive to internal-external security nexus. What are the main drivers of 
change in the military role in this new context? What types of new referent objects, 
threats and other actors significantly influence the contemporary military role? And 
finally, how this translates into the fluctuation of this role?
The aim of this article is to discuss the dynamics of the military role in the con-
text of the internal-external security nexus by analysing it in two areas of military 
involvement: domestic operations against terrorism and cyber space. In doing so, 
I show how the military role is fluctuating, using the conceptualisations of “warrior” 
and “peacekeeper” roles as points of reference. Of course, the contemporary military 
engagement goes far beyond involvement in cyber protection and domestic coun-
ter-terrorism operations. However, these two areas clearly depict the most prominent 
aspects of internal-external security nexus [Eriksson, Rhinard 2009] which charac-
terises the dynamics of contemporary security context. In the article I show that in 
both areas the military role is stimulated by similar conceptualisations of referent 
objects, threats and other actors. I focus my analysis on the European armed forces 
which, to a large extent, share structural, political and cultural foundations. Based on 
that and despite obvious heterogeneity between states and within the armed forces 
it is possible to assume that European societies construct military roles in similar 
ways [Edmunds 2006; Svircsev Tresch 2007].
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CONCEPTUAl FRAmEWORK
Following Bruce Biddle [1986: 68], I define a role as a set of “patterned and 
characteristic social behaviours (...) [together with] expectations for behaviour that 
are understood by all and adhered to by performers”. Thus, a role consists of a set 
of norms and values regulating the behaviour of an actor, which are simultaneously 
comprehended by both – the actor playing the role and other actors. As demonstrat-
ed by Donald Campbell and Kathleen Campbell’s [2010: 333] conceptual model 
of “drivers” of a role change, it is possible to distinguish two broad sets of factors 
which underlie a shift of a role: “internal, stakeholder-based change drivers; and 
external, societal-based change drivers”. The internal change drivers originate in the 
evolving view on the role held by the actor who plays it, while the external change 
drivers have their source “in the general political, legal, economic, technological, 
and other contextual forces surrounding the role” [Campbell, Campbell 2010: 333]. 
In the article I focus on the analysis of the latter type of drivers of role change which 
stem from other actors, their positions and expectations.
In the case of the military role, these external role change drivers are deeply 
embedded in the security context understood as security conditions and frameworks 
in which the military is positioned vis-à-vis identified threats and security challenges. 
Depending on the security context, it is possible to distinguish various other actors 
with whom the military interacts and who thus constitute change drivers in military 
role. Among them are political elites, actors constituting a threat, referent objects,2 
as well as audience. Referent objects and threats (both internal and external) [Eriks-
son, Rhinard 2009: 243–267] are defined and contested by political and military 
elites. Thus, the elites position the military between the identified threats and the 
valued object. When some of the threats lose their significance in a new context (e.g. 
due to the fall of the Soviet Union), the elites immediately start defining new ones 
[Campbell 1992]. Such change of definitions of either referent objects or threats 
might downplay old and introduce new actors into the interaction with the military. 
Consequently, this may lead to modification of the position of the military and trigger 
an adjustment of its role.
An audience observes and (if the presented definition of the situation is coherent) 
legitimises interaction between actors [Thies 2010]. Often the distinction between 
actors and an audience is difficult to establish as audiences might possess considera-
ble agency. Adam Côté [2016: 5–46] observed that in large portions of the empirical 
literature, the audience actively participates in the interactions and intersubjective 
construction of security. In this way, the audience can also function as a role change 
driver, indirectly influencing and shaping the roles performed by actors.
2 Following securitization vocabulary, referent object is understood as a valued object that requires 
protection. For more see: Watson [2011: 3–20] and Stępka [2018].
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Building on this theoretical discussion, I will treat the military role as a con-
text-dependent, patterned behaviour which is subjected to change through two types 
of factors: the evolving view of the military role held by the military itself, as well as 
due to the influence of other actors. These other actors are embedded in the security 
context and include, among others, political elites, threats, referent objects, as well 
as an audience. They can directly or indirectly influence the shape of the military role 
through interactions with the military and expectations towards the military. They 
can have an internal or external character which further affects the military role. 
The level of significance of other actors is highly contextual and can be downplayed 
or reinforced depending on the political and security-related circumstances. In the 
following parts of the article, I will discuss how the changing context and various 
significant others influenced the role of the military in the past and reflect upon the 
dynamics of the military role in the contemporary security context.
“WARRIOR” VS. “PEACEKEEPER”
The traditional conceptualisation of the military role has been developing for 
centuries and is strongly connected with the combat function of the armed forces [see: 
Coker 2007]. In the following parts of the article, I will refer to it as the “warrior role” 
of the military. This traditional conceptualisation gains significance in the realistic 
approach to international relations. Because the actions of states are governed by 
a security dilemma and a drive to maximise state’s profits, wars are inevitable [Hun-
tington 1957]. For this reason, the core function of the military is built around the 
concept of war – the military is either engaged in combat or preparing for it [Coker 
2007]. This specific security context puts the military vis-à-vis particular types of 
actors who directly and indirectly shape the “warrior role”.
The main referent object for the “warrior role” is the state – the continuity of its 
existence, sovereignty and territorial integrity [see: Smith 1986]. The character of 
the referent object is, therefore, profoundly internal. However, the primacy of the 
state does not necessarily mean the primacy of the domestic society. As observed 
by Tobias Thelier [2010: 106], the traditional realistic approach is so focused on the 
protection of the state that it pays “little systematic attention to what is inside states 
– above all to society”. It could be argued that in this conceptualisation, the domestic 
society acts as an audience as it observes and reacts to the interaction between the 
military and other actors, such as political elites or threats. By expressing its opinion 
in democratic elections, the domestic society influences the way military means are 
utilised by the political elites, thus indirectly shaping the “warrior role” of the military.
In the realist approach, the international system is characterised by anarchy, thus 
the state is constantly exposed to threats arising from other external military forces, 
e.g. of independent states [Huntington 1957: 1]. In this sense, the adversary tends to 
be clearly defined and can be easily identified in the international arena. An attack of 
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foreign entity could result in elimination of the state – the threat has, therefore, an 
existential character. Consequently, the enemy forces can be regarded as one of the 
most significant actors in reference to whom the “warrior role” is shaped.
The “warrior role” of the military is also shaped in the process of interactions 
with domestic political elites. They should not be equated with the state as their in-
terests (e.g. keeping the power) might be more particularistic than state’s continuity 
and survival [Buzan et al. 1998: 56]. Nevertheless, the influence of political elites on 
the “warrior role” of the military is grand as they not only define the threat but also 
decide upon the time, place and method of the use of military means. In this sense, 
political elites actively shape the context for the “warrior role” and expectations 
towards the behaviour of the military.
This realistic perception of the role of the military has changed with the introduc-
tion and development of peacekeeping. The new security context was grounded in the 
liberal paradigm and included the notion of humanitarian intervention as a legitimate 
way of using military means to prevent violations of human rights [Chandler 2004]. 
The first peacekeeping missions conducted by the United Nations restricted the use 
of the armed forces by applying principles of consent of the sides of the conflict, 
neutrality of the military and the limited use of force [United Nations 2018]. Thus, 
the new security context juxtaposed the military with new types of actors, inducing 
a change in the military role into a “peacekeeper role” [moskos 1976: 55–77].
In this conceptualisation, the state is still an important referent object as the military 
is still obliged to protect it [Buzan et al. 1998: 49]. However, together with peacekeep-
ing, the liberal paradigm moved the centre of gravity towards the civilian population 
native to the area of peacekeeping operation [UN DPKO and UN DFS 2008]. In this 
sense, the “peacekeeper role” of the military is shaped by the necessity of protection of 
civilians and adherence to the humanitarian values [Broesder et al. 2015: 524]. Argua-
bly, the military taking part in peacekeeping operations no longer fights for its state but 
for human rights and human dignity. Thus in the conceptualisation of the “peacekeeper 
role”, the referent object is more ambiguous than in the case of “warrior role”.
Similarly, the definition of threat underwent significant changes. many peace-
keeping operations assume a non-combat character, in which the rules of engagement 
are vague and the enemy is difficult to identify [Franke 1999b: 124–143]. David last 
[1997: 6] goes as far as defining the “enemy” in peacekeeping as the violent conflict 
itself – the military is therefore deployed to put an end to hostilities and advance rec-
onciliation between the warring parties [see also: Hansen et al. 2004]. Furthermore, 
as many peacekeeping missions consist of “unarmed military observers and lightly 
armed troops with primarily monitoring, reporting and confidence-building roles” 
[United Nations 2018], the external enemy forces are no longer the main significant 
actor shaping the military role. Consequently, in case of “peacekeeper role” the threat 
is more ambiguous than in the case of the “warrior role”.
In the liberal conceptualisation of the military role, the catalogue of actors that 
function as the drivers of role change seems to be broader than in the realistic para-
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digm. It still includes the domestic political elites which decide on the participation 
of the armed forces in peacekeeping operations. However, the security context in-
troduces other actors such as the international political elites and the multinational 
military forces which together shape the behavioral patterns of the military and 
influence its role. The audience which observes and legitimizes the interaction be-
tween the military and other actors is also broader as it consists of both domestic 
and international public opinion [Castells 2008: 80].
Following this discussion, it should be noted that the “peacekeeper role” does 
not stand in opposition to the “warrior role”. It marginalises some of its elements, 
replacing them with norms that are better suited to conduct successful interactions 
in a different context and with different actors. At the same time, other elements of 
the “warrior role” remain significant also in the “peacekeeper role”. It should also be 
stressed that the theoretical divide between realism and liberalism presented above 
does not account for all the complexities of the military use. However, it serves as 
a useful analytical tool to depict the characteristics of the context and the external 
drivers of change shaping the military roles. As shown by this overview, the military 
role is dynamic and constantly subjected to influences of contextual drivers of change. 
The modern complex security environment which encompasses a whole range of 
threats, starting from hybrid warfare to regional crises, opens the discussion about 
the dynamics of the military role for critical overview.
THE CONTEmPORARy SECURITy CONTExT – INTERNAl-ExTERNAl 
SECURITy NExUS
The fall of the bi-polar system and growing globalisation have reshaped the 
security context and changed its perception by shifting the attention away from 
a state towards other actors and away from the traditional military security to other 
types of threats and referent objects [Weiss 2011: 396]. Johan Eriksson and mark 
Rhinard [2009: 246] observe that in the globalising world, security problems origi-
nate from more clandestine and obscure sources, have more complex trajectories and 
their effects are difficult to predict or prepare to. Thus, the contemporary security 
issues are transversal – they cannot be contained within a single state, region or 
even dimension of security. Consequently, security can no longer be easily divided 
into internal and external dimension, but rather constitutes “one sole universe that is 
currently developing: the field of security” which traverses this divide [Bigo 2001: 
103]. As Didier Bigo [2001: 92] argues “the dividing line, which has long been po-
rous, between the forces in charge of security within the territory (i.e. police forces) 
and those responsible for defending the territory itself (i.e. military people), is now 
becoming more and more uncertain”.
Together with the emergence of complex security issues (e.g. terrorism, cyber 
attacks, transnational crime, regional conflicts or environmental threats), the military 
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has become a part of the internal-external security nexus [Bigo 2001]. Traditionally, 
it has been ascribed to the external security dimension focusing on defence and deter-
rence between states. The matters of internal security such as crime, civil protection, 
law and order in the domestic context had not been included in the scope of interest 
of the armed forces [Huntington 1957: 1]. Currently, as threats become transnational, 
the military does both: fights external enemies and assists in alleviating risks to in-
ternal security [Bigo 2001; lutterbeck 2004]. In this sense, it is required to function 
within the space of security traversing the internal-external divide.
This multidimensionality of the contemporary security context poses several 
challenges for the conceptualisation of the modern military role. In the following 
sections, I will discuss the dynamics of the contemporary military role by analysing 
the external drivers of change within two areas of military involvement: domestic 
operations countering global terrorism and fight against cyber attacks.
TERRORISM
Global terrorism constitutes one of the examples of transversal threats as it em-
ploys communication systems and globalized travel networks, spreading violence 
in different countries and producing psychological effects even far away from the 
crime scene [Eriksson, Rhinard 2009: 247]. The military has become involved in 
the fight against terrorism in two ways: through external operations and securing the 
domestic societies native to the force. While it could be argued that the contextual 
factors of external anti-terrorism operations do not significantly modify the “warri-
or” and “peacekeeper” roles, an important change can be observed in the domestic 
dimension. I argue that this domestic aspect of anti-terrorism operations conducted 
in the country native to the force influences the relation of the military with other 
actors, thus introducing important drivers of role change.
The most prominent drivers of role change that emerge in domestic counter-ter-
rorism operations when compared to “warrior” and “peacekeeper” are referent ob-
jects, here construed as critical infrastructure and the civilian population native to 
the force. The obligation to protect civilians and key sites is clearly visible in the 
mandates of recent European anti-terrorist operations in France (Operation Sent-
inelle), the United Kingdom (Operation Temperer) and Belgium (Operations Vigilant 
Guardian and Spring Guardian). Under these operations, military personnel has been 
deployed for policing purposes, including patrolling the streets and guarding key 
sites such as nuclear facilities, government buildings, airports and metro stations 
[Chrisafis 2016; la Defense 2017; Hirst 2017]. Here, operations Sentinelle and 
Vigilant Guardian represent historical cases as they are the first wide-scale peacetime 
military operations on the French and Belgian mainland. Furthermore, as a result of 
Operation Sentinelle, “for the first time since the end of the Cold War, the number of 
French army soldiers actively deployed in metropolitan France roughly equals that 
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of overseas operations” [la Defense 2015; mcAuley 2016]. The internal, peacetime 
engagement becomes a significant aspect of military work.
The element of protection of the state characteristic to the “warrior role” is still 
present in domestic counter-terrorism operations. The referent objects are the key 
sites which include historical monuments and state’s critical infrastructure. In other 
words, the military is still concentrated on the protection of the sites necessary for 
the survival of the state and continuity of government. However, unlike in “warri-
or” conceptualisation, anti-terrorist operations on the domestic ground require the 
military to protect the civilian population. Thus, in the case of internal operations, 
the domestic society has become a significant driver of change in the military role, 
actively influencing it through intensive, everyday interactions. A soldier deployed 
under the Operation Vigilant Guardian observed that unlike in “warrior” or “peace-
keeper” roles: “After the many operations abroad, we are now visible to them [the 
domestic population]” [la Defense 2015]. Consequently, the military is facing strong 
expectations regarding its behaviour. Its role needs to incorporate norms regulating 
the behaviour and accountability in a situation of an active duty during peacetime 
in densely populated, urban areas inhabited by a population native to the force. This 
constitutes a significant change in comparison to the previous conceptualisations of 
the military role. In case of both “warrior” and “peacekeeper” the domestic society 
acted at best as an audience, affecting the military only in an indirect way. 
The character of terrorist threat constitutes another change driver in military 
role, moving it away from the “warrior” and “peacekeeper”. James lutz and Brenda 
lutz [2013: 275] point to a specific, networked and dispersed organisational form 
of terrorism – the so-called leaderless resistance, in which leaders maintain distance 
from the operatives in the field and in which “individuals or small groups operate as 
a part of a broader movement, even though they may not have direct links with a lead-
ership”. This can be exemplified by the 2017 london attack committed by a British 
national, who, according to the police, “had previous convictions for violence but 
not terrorism offenses” and who “was inspired by international terrorism” [Smith-
Spark, Jordan 2017]. In this sense, the military is confronted with a particular type 
of adversary, who, unlike in the “warrior role”, cannot be easily identified, traced 
or fought. As pointed out by a soldier participating in the Operation Sentinelle, “in 
an external operation, the threat is clearly identified. Here it’s complicated, it can be 
everywhere, at any time, in any form” [Hernandez 2017]. Consequently, the con-
temporary military role is shaped in relation to a threat that is far more vague and 
intangible than in the case of the “warrior role”. To a larger degree it resembles the 
threat shaping the “peacekeeper role”.
However, both “warrior” and “peacekeeper” roles were shaped in a context where 
threats had a predominantly external character. In the case of contemporary domestic 
counter-terrorism operations the military faces an enemy that could be both external 
and internal. As claimed by Alex Wilner and Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz [2010: 34], 
and supported by the example of the 2017 london attack, the perpetrators of terrorist 
15THE DyNAmICS OF THE CONTEmPORARy mIlITARy ROlE: IN SEARCH OF FlExIBIlITy
attacks in Europe are often “citizens and residents born, raised, and educated within 
the countries they attack”, inspired and radicalised by external terrorist organisations 
[see also: Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010]. This poses a challenge for the contemporary 
military, as its role needs to include norms regulating the behaviour in a situation 
where the source of threat – a radicalised terrorist, can equally likely be of an external 
provenance or be a part of the referent object – the domestic society. Such a complex 
threat is arguably a novel element, which shapes different behavioural patterns when 
compared to “warrior” and “peacekeeper” roles.
National law enforcement agencies are yet another important driver of military 
role change in domestic counter-terrorism operations, which is arguably not accom-
modated to a sufficient degree neither by “warrior”, nor “peacekeeper” roles. The 
mandates of the above-mentioned operations necessitate very close cooperation of 
the military personnel with police forces [may 2017; Bartunek 2017; Hernandez 
2017]. As explained by the UK’s Prime minister Theresa may, under the Operation 
Temperer, the military not only replaces police officers in protecting sites and events, 
but is deployed under the command of the police [may 2017]. This significant 
interference in the military chain of command (even if temporary) is indicative of 
the shifting perception of the military as a security provider, which in this case is 
submitted to the police, and its role in the internal security domain. In the scheme of 
counter-terrorism operations conducted on the domestic soil, the military is expected 
to act as a part of the police force. What is more, in accordance with the UK’s National 
Security Strategy, the military planners are placed in key government departments 
“to give the military a wider and more formal role in supporting national resilience 
contingency planning” [Her majesty Government 2015: 4.149]. Consequently, the 
contemporary military becomes embedded in the civilian structures responsible for 
internal security during peacetime which strongly influences the military role. 
The necessity of close interdepartmental cooperation is visible also in other op-
erations like Vigilant Guardian, where the military works under the supervision of 
the police, as it does not have the same powers (e.g. to conduct identification checks) 
[Bartunek 2017; manigart 2017]. As a result of this type of military engagement, the 
blurring difference between internal and external security necessitates the military 
role to accommodate a deep interdepartmental collaboration and information-sharing 
[Edmunds 2006: 1064]. Taking over the traditional internal/external security tasks by 
various actors influences their respective roles also through tensions as they struggle 
over the prevalent definitions of threats and delineation of responsibilities, striving 
to play a more important role in the security system [see: Bigo 2001]. This type of 
interaction is marginal in the “warrior role”, where the internal security agencies are 
clearly separated from the military. Arguably, it is also much less significant in the 




The cyber dimension of the contemporary security context constitutes one of 
the clearest examples of the blurred division between internal and external security 
[Bigo 2001]. The growing digitalisation, reliance of public and private sectors on 
information infrastructure and the emergence of interconnected societies result in 
intertwining of national and international dimensions of cyber security. As observed 
by myriam Dunn Cavelty, “borders, already porous in many ways in the real world 
[are] non-existent in cyber space” [Dunn Cavelty 2013: 370]. In 2016, NATO mem-
ber states recognised cyber space as one of the operational domains of the armed 
forces, next to land, air, sea and space [North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 2016: 
70]. In this way, cyber space has officially become part of the context that shapes 
the contemporary military role. The characteristics of actors interacting with the 
military within cyber space strongly resemble those that shape the contemporary 
military role during domestic counter-terrorism operations.
In cyber dimension the range of referent objects is very wide. It includes tradi-
tional conceptualisations of referent objects (typical for the “warrior role”), as well 
as more dispersed actors resembling those defined in peacekeeping and in domestic 
counter-terrorism operations. Firstly, as in the conceptualisation of the “warrior role”, 
the referent object in cyber space is the critical (information) infrastructure, essential 
for the continuous functioning of the state and the ability of governments and ad-
ministrations to conduct their tasks. Critical information infrastructure comprises of 
information systems that are “indispensable for normal day-to-day civil life and their 
incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating impact on economic security 
or the defence capabilities of a country” [Siroli 2006: 36]. Thus, similarly as in the 
case of the “warrior role” and in internal anti-terrorism operations, the armed forces 
are expected to protect the infrastructure that allows the state to continue effective 
functioning [Her majesty’s Government 2016: 1.10; The Federal Government of 
Germany 2016: 93]. For example, the Italian National Strategic Framework for 
Cyberspace Security requires the Armed Forces to “effectively prevent, identify, 
react to, manage, mitigate and neutralize malicious activities targeting national ICT 
[Information and Communication Technologies] networks” [Italian Presidency of 
the Council of ministers 2013].
As observed by Wolfgang Röhrig and Rob Smeaton [2014: 24], “as the military 
become increasingly interconnected, using internet technologies, internet vulnera-
bilities get closer to individual soldiers and their weapon systems”. Consequently, in 
the contemporary security context, military networks and networked armed forces 
have become one of the important state-related referent objects [Dunn Cavelty 2013: 
365]. The contemporary military increasingly relies on networks of communication, 
command and control systems, which makes those systems a target. For example, 
in 2009, German, French and British military systems were attacked by the “Con-
ficker” worm, disrupting routine military operations [see: loukas 2015; Radziwill 
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2015]. As in the realistic paradigm, in cyber space the military is therefore expected 
to protect its own infrastructure and networks in order to maintain capabilities de-
fending the state. This is expressed among others in British National Cyber Security 
Strategy which emphasises the need of the British Armed Forces to be “resilient and 
have the strong cyber defences they need to secure and defend their networks and 
platforms, continuing to operate and retaining global freedom of manoeuvre despite 
cyber threats” [Her majesty’s Government 2016: 1.10]. Consequently, following the 
“warrior” conceptualisation, the contemporary military role needs to take into account 
a situation in which the military, as the main security provider, is simultaneously 
shaped as an object that requires protection.
Secondly, the referent object in cyber space includes non-state actors that interact 
with (and within) the critical information infrastructure. Due to digitalisation, critical 
information infrastructure is increasingly utilised by businesses and individuals [The 
Federal Government of Germany 2016: 36]. In this sense, referent objects in cyber 
space – just like in liberal paradigm and in the domestic anti-terrorist operations – 
are also constituted by the population. However, what is not accounted for by the 
“peacekeeper” conceptualisation is the transnational character of some of the civilian, 
non-state referent objects. Companies that operate across international borders use 
(and build) the critical information infrastructure, consequently becoming a part of 
the referent object that shapes the contemporary military role. In this sense, in cyber 
space, similarly as in domestic anti-terrorism, the referent object is much broader 
than in the “warrior” or “peacekeeper” conceptualisations. Thus, in the contemporary 
security context, the military role needs to include norms regulating its behaviour 
vis-à-vis a multifaceted and highly networked referent object, parts of which cannot 
be contained within national borders.
A specific type of actors conducting cyber-attacks constitutes another significant 
driver of change shaping the contemporary military role. Gian Piero Siroli [2006: 
42] distinguishes few general classes of such actors, including hackers, insiders, 
criminals at the individual level or within organisations, as well as politically moti-
vated state and non-state groups. This (non-exclusive) classification is also utilized 
by the German government, which states “the means to carry out cyber-attacks are 
not restricted to state actors. Terrorist groups, criminal organisations, and skilled 
individuals can potentially cause serious damage with minimal effort” [The Federal 
Government of Germany 2016: 36]. In this sense, in cyber space the catalogue of 
actors constituting a threat includes those defined in “warrior” and “peacekeeper” 
conceptualisations, but is also much broader. Here, the adversary is even less tangible 
than in the case of counter-terrorism operations, as cyber-attacks may be conducted 
by actors driven by various (not only political) motivations. Another factor, which is 
not accounted for by neither realistic nor liberal conceptualisations of military role, is 
that actors conducting cyber attacks can be either internal or external. For example, 
it is assumed that the perpetrators of cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007 were linked 
with an external actor – Russia, or an internal actor – Russian minority in Estonia 
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[Herzog 2011: 52]. This example shows another characteristic of cyber threats – it is 
extremely difficult to reveal the identity of actors standing behind cyber attacks [Dunn 
Cavelty 2013: 368]. Thus, unlike in “warrior” and “peacekeeper” conceptualisations, 
the behaviour of the contemporary military role is influenced by the multitude and 
anonymity of potential adversaries. Here, the source of threat is radically intangible 
as it can be either external or internal, posed by an individual or a group, or be either 
a state or non-state actor.
Similarly as in the case of military involvement in domestic anti-terrorism oper-
ations, the military countering cyber threats is compelled to closely interact with law 
enforcement and intelligence community. According to the German government, “the 
threat situation in cyber space necessitates a holistic approach in the framework of 
cyber security policy” [The Federal Government of Germany 2016: 38] and therefore 
requires a whole-of-government approach. Similar line of thought is visible in Italy, 
where the Cyber Security Unit has been placed within the Prime minister military 
Advisor’s Office with a mandate to coordinate the actions of “various institutions that 
compose the national cyber security architecture” [Italian Presidency of the Council 
of ministers 2013: 27]. Thus, civilian security providers and intelligence agencies 
become significant actors that shape the contemporary military role.
However, the most significant driver of military role change in cyber dimension is 
the unique involvement of the society, academia and the private sector. In the previous 
conceptualisations of military role, the society interacts with the military only indi-
rectly, mostly as an audience. As elaborated above, counter-terrorism operations have 
made the society more active in shaping the military role. Here, the society, academia 
and the private sector not only act as referent objects, as described above, but become 
a crucial partner in countering cyber threats. Geoffrey Darnton [2006: 140] points out 
to the “increasing inseparability of civilian and military technology and infrastructure” 
which results in the blurring of line between public and private cyber protection [see 
also: Boeke et al. 2015: 69–80]. Similarly, NATO recognises that the input of private 
sector in cyber security is invaluable as “technological innovations and expertise from 
the private sector are crucial to enable NATO and Allied countries to mount an effec-
tive cyber defence” [NATO Public Diplomacy Division 2016]. In this vein, European 
cyber security strategies [Her majesty’s Government 2016; Italian Presidency of the 
Council of ministers 2013; Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nation-
ale 2015; The Federal Government of Germany 2016] share a position that, as cyber 
threats impact entire societies, it is necessary for everyone – from individuals, through 
businesses, to universities and public administration – to be included in countering 
them. Consequently, as observed by Röhrig and Smeaton [2014: 26], in cyber space 
“there is no difference between military and civilian actors (…). If we are to deliver 
effective protection, the military must be part of the civilian cyber protection activity 
and be able to share information with all actors”. In “warrior” and “peacekeeper” con-
ceptualisations of the military role such levelling of the military and civilian actors is 
unthinkable. Both rely on clear distinctions between the armed forces and civilians. In 
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the case of cyber dimension, these distinctions are at best limited, as all actors present 
in cyber space are equally significant for maintaining its security and are expected to 
contribute to countering cyber threats.
CONClUSIONS
The security context is constantly evolving, influencing conceptualisations of 
referent objects, threats and actors responsible for the provision of security. Due to 
the internal-external security nexus, the military role has become wider (in terms 
of new and/or changed threats), as well as deeper (in terms of new and/or changed 
referent objects and partners). This is not to say that the more traditional conceptu-
alisations of the military role – “warrior” and “peacekeeper” – are now obsolete or 
invalid. The armed forces are still required to protect the state against foreign invasion 
and are sent to peacekeeping missions to protect civilians and separate the warring 
parties. However, in this article I argue that these roles no longer fully account for 
the expectations towards the military posed by the contemporary security context. 
Consequently, the contemporary military role needs to be much more reflexive and 
flexible than assumed in “warrior” and “peacekeeper” conceptualisations. This flexi-
bility is necessary in order to effectively protect a variety of referent objects, counter 
dispersed and networked threats, and interact with a growing number of partners.
Firstly, the contemporary military role requires more adaptability with regard 
to referent objects. When compared to the more traditional understandings of the 
military role, currently the armed forces are expected to protect a wider range of 
actors. This is particularly visible in case of its engagement in cyber space, where 
the catalogue of raeferent objects includes information infrastructure and the actors 
that use it – from the state and its agencies to individual users. In this sense, the 
military needs to be able to quickly reflect on and adapt its behaviour depending on 
the type of actor that is threatened. Contrary to this, in the case of the “warrior” role, 
the referent objects are more narrowly defined and more stable, and thus require less 
flexibility in the military’s behaviour. With the shift towards the “peacekeeper” role, 
this expectation of flexibility increases, but it still does not fulfil the levels required 
by the contemporary security context. What is more, as indicated in the article, using 
the armed forces in countering terrorism within the borders of their own country 
sets them in a changed position in relation to the domestic society. A prolonged 
presence of heavily armed military personnel on the streets during peacetime, forc-
es reconsideration of expectations on how and when the armed forces are utilised, 
and what norms should guide their behaviour and accountability. For “warrior” and 
“peacekeeper” this is not necessary, as the domestic society is not construed as the 
main referent object and thus does not have a strong influence on the behaviour of 
the military. The flexibility of the military role necessitated by the contemporary se-
curity context has also another dimension – the referent object can be simultaneously 
AGATA MAZURKIEWICZ20
construed as another type of significant actor. As elaborated before, the domestic 
society can harbour the source of a threat in case of counter-terrorism operations, 
and be treated as a partner in providing security in cyber space. In this sense, the 
contemporary military role needs to be flexible enough to account for interactions 
with actors whose definition can be fluctuating.
Secondly, the contemporary military role requires more flexibility with regard to 
countering threats and the application of violence. In the realistic conceptualisation of 
the “warrior” role, the definition of threat and consequently the military’s response and 
behaviour is relatively straightforward. It becomes more complex together with the 
shift towards the “peacekeeper” role, where the actors constituting the threat are less 
intelligible and easy to address. However, the catalogue of the contemporary threats 
not only incorporates those outlined by the “warrior” and “peacekeeper” conceptual-
isations, but also includes actors that are nearly impossible to identify and reach – like 
the proponents of cyber attacks. As elaborated in the article, the modern sources of 
threat can also be very difficult to separate from the referent object, as in the case 
of terrorist attacks. In this sense, the contemporary military role needs to be flexible 
enough to manage threats that are multi-faceted, multi-directional, difficult to predict 
and traversing the internal-external security divide. Consequently, it is also required 
to incorporate behavioural patterns which allow to adjust the level of violence used 
in response to these threats. In the “warrior” conceptualisation, where the military is 
employed to fight enemy forces, the expected level of violence seems to be relatively 
predictable and stable. It becomes much more fluctuating with the “peacekeeper” role, 
where the definition of the threat becomes blurred. However, in the present security 
context the expectation of flexibility in the application of violence is even higher. 
While managing contemporary complex threats such as terrorism, the armed forces are 
mobilised into a state of readiness for combat just like in a situation of a conventional 
war. yet, unlike in the latter situation, fighting terrorism in the internal security setting 
or countering cyber attacks rarely involves physically engaging the enemy. When it 
does, it necessitates a strong consideration of the potential consequences of the use 
of force in the presence of civilian bystanders or innocent users of the information 
infrastructure. In this sense, the contemporary military role needs to allow the armed 
forces to manage its response in a flexible manner, providing grounds for reflection 
on the appropriate level and the consequences of the use of force.
Finally, the flexibility of the contemporary military role is necessitated by close 
collaboration with other actors who participate in provision of security. The scope and 
intensity of this interdepartmental cooperation is arguably much larger in the security 
context driven by the internal-external security nexus, than in realistic and liberal 
paradigms. It could be argued that the influence of internal security agencies on the 
“warrior” role is rather incidental and indirect. It increases in the case of the “peace-
keeper” conceptualisation, as the military works beside the police personnel in the 
context of external missions. However, as shown in the article, in the contemporary 
security context this collaboration becomes much deeper and more frequent. During 
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counter-terrorism operations set in the domestic environment, the armed forces are 
required to work under the supervision of the police, or are even temporarily placed 
under the command of the police. In regard to cyber space, some scholars even go 
as far as equating the military and civilian providers of security. As a consequence of 
this particular security context, the military needs to be flexible enough to be able to 
work separately, together with and under the command of internal security agencies. 
Furthermore, as elaborated in the article, the internal-external security nexus means 
that more actors become involved in providing security as the military’s partners. 
This is particularly visible in cyber space, as the armed forces are expected to closely 
cooperate not only with internal security agencies, but also with the private sector 
and academia. Consequently, the behaviour of the military needs to be adapted to 
various partners, both public and private, requiring large degrees of flexibility and 
reflexivity inscribed in the contemporary military role.
There are several possible avenues of further inquiry which consider the conse-
quences of this dynamics of the military role. One of the questions that come to mind 
is the effect of this evolution on military identity. On the one hand, due to increasing 
level and scope of interactions with various types of civilians and the exposure to 
internal security issues, soldiers might assume elements of identities of internal secu-
rity agents. On the other hand, while competing for resources with internal security 
agencies the armed forces might be strengthening their own identity constructed in 
opposition to civilian significant others. In which direction will the military identity 
evolve? Another question regards the exceptionality of the use of military means. 
Bearing in mind the new, broadened role of the military, to what extent do the armed 
forces remain an exceptional measure in fighting threats? In the new security context, 
there might be a need to redefine the threshold which has to be crossed in order to resort 
to the use of military means. Finally, the growing involvement of the armed forces in 
internal security might add some new incentives into the discussion on civil-military 
relations. How does the new military role affect the power relations and the position 
of the military within the domestic society? In sum, the contemporary security context 
and the effect of the internal-external security nexus create conditions for the evolution 
of military role and open up new possible ways of understanding the scale and form 
of its involvement in fighting external and internal threats.
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